Santa Clara Law

Santa Clara Law Digital Commons
Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

1-2015

Bond v. United States: Choosing the Lesser of Two
Evils
David Sloss
Santa Clara University School of Law, dlsloss@scu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs
Part of the Law Commons
Automated Citation
David Sloss, Bond v. United States: Choosing the Lesser of Two Evils (2015),
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/874

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.

Bond v. United States: Choosing The Lesser of Two Evils
David Sloss
In Bond v. United States, Carol Anne Bond used toxic chemicals in an attempt to poison
her husband’s lover.1 The federal government prosecuted Bond for violating the Chemical
Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 (the “CWC Act”).2 Congress enacted the
CWC Act to implement U.S. obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), a
multilateral treaty signed in 1993 that is designed to address the global threat posed by chemical
weapons.3 Bond challenged the constitutional validity of the federal statute and urged the Court
to overrule Missouri v Holland, a 1920 case holding that the combination of the Treaty Power
and the Necessary and Proper Clause empowers Congress to enact treaty-implementing
legislation that would exceed the scope of Congress’ Article I powers in the absence of a treaty.4
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, avoided the constitutional question by adopting a
narrow construction of the statute.5 Justice Scalia, writing for himself and Justice Thomas, would
have overruled Holland and invalidated the CWC Act.6
This essay makes two main points. First, the majority’s interpretation of the CWC Act is
inconsistent with the statute and the underlying treaty. Indeed, the majority opinion displays a
basic misunderstanding about the design of the underlying treaty. Second, Justice Scalia’s
construction of the Necessary and Proper Clause is antithetical to the structure and original
understanding of the Constitution. If adopted as law, Justice Scalia’s view would seriously harm
the federal government’s ability to conduct foreign affairs on behalf of the nation. Since Justice
Scalia’s constitutional error would be far more damaging than the majority’s statutory error, the
majority’s statutory misinterpretation is the lesser of two evils.
I
The Statutory Issue in Bond
Chief Roberts began his opinion in Bond by invoking the horrors of World War I. He
claimed that the international reaction to the use of chemical weapons in World War I led to “an
overwhelming consensus in the international community that toxic chemicals should never again
be used as weapons against human beings.” Nowadays, he said, “that objective is reflected in
the” CWC.7 With due respect for the Chief Justice, his view of history is seriously mistaken.
International reaction to the horrors of World War I led to adoption of the 1925 Geneva Protocol,
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which banned the use of chemical weapons.8 Unfortunately, the 1925 Protocol was a failure
because it did not address the two central problems that modern arms control treaties are
designed to address: breakout and verification.
The 1925 Protocol merely banned the “use in war” of chemical weapons. It did not ban
the manufacture or stockpiling of chemical weapons. Accordingly, the treaty created a breakout
problem: States could legally acquire large stockpiles of chemical weapons and then “break out”
from the treaty constraints on a moment’s notice by using those weapons in war. One way to
address the breakout problem would be to ban the manufacture and stockpiling of chemical
weapons. Even this approach, however, does not fully address the breakout problem. Under this
approach, States could lawfully acquire large stockpiles of toxic chemicals that could be
converted into weapons on very short notice. Such stockpiles of chemicals pose a significant
threat to other nations. The CWC is designed to address that threat. Accordingly, the CWC
obligates States not to “develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical
weapons.”9 Moreover, it defines the term “chemical weapons” to include “toxic chemicals and
their precursors.”10 Thus, unlike the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the 1993 CWC incorporates two key
features to address the breakout problem. Instead of merely banning the use of chemical
weapons, it bans development, production, acquisition and stockpiling. And instead of focusing
narrowly on chemicals that have already been converted into weapons, it defines the term
“chemical weapon” broadly to encompass “any chemical which through its chemical action on
life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or
animals.”11 Both of these features are essential to the overall design of the treaty. Without both,
States could lawfully acquire large stockpiles of toxic chemicals that could easily be converted
into weapons of mass destruction.
Congress recognized that these features of the treaty were integral to the overall treaty
design, so it incorporated both features into the CWC Act. The statute makes it unlawful for any
person “to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, transfer directly or indirectly, receive, stockpile,
retain, own, possess, or use, or threaten to use, any chemical weapon.”12 It defines the term
chemical weapon to include “a toxic chemical and its precursors.”13 Moreover, the statute
defines the term toxic chemical to mean “[a]ny chemical which through its chemical action on
life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or
animals.”14 In short, Congress understood that the 1925 Geneva Protocol was seriously flawed
because it did not address the breakout problem. Accordingly, Congress incorporated into the
implementing legislation key features of the CWC that were specifically designed to address the
breakout problem.
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Chief Justice Roberts and the Bond majority were apparently unaware of the critical
differences between the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1993 CWC. The majority says that “an
educated user of English would not describe Bond’s crime as involving a ‘chemical weapon.’”
The opinion adds: “When used in the manner here, the chemicals in this case are not of the sort
that an ordinary person would associate with instruments of chemical warfare.”15 These
statements are true, but they manifest the majority’s utter failure to grasp the critical differences
between the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the CWC. The 1925 Geneva Protocol failed to address
the threat of chemical weapons precisely because it merely prohibited the types of conduct “that
an ordinary person would associate with . . . chemical warfare.” The States that drafted and
negotiated the CWC were determined to address the breakout problem by prohibiting a wide
range of conduct that the ordinary person would not associate with chemical warfare.
Recognizing that the 1925 treaty had failed to address the underlying problem, Congress enacted
a federal statute to implement the more far-reaching provisions of the CWC. The Bond majority
misinterpreted the CWC Act because the Justices mistakenly believed that the Act was merely
intended to address the types of chemicals that an ordinary person would associate with chemical
warfare.
As noted above, modern arms control treaties are designed to address both breakout and
verification problems. The preceding analysis focuses on breakout. Let us now turn to
verification. In theory, States could address the breakout problem by establishing quantitative
limits for stockpiling toxic chemicals in non-weapons form. After all, acquisition of a few grams
of a toxic chemical is unlikely to pose a serious national security threat. The quantity that
represents a serious threat varies depending on the type of chemical at issue. Regardless, States
could conceivably agree on a detailed schedule specifying permissible quantities of different
types of toxic chemicals falling below the threshold that might reasonably be deemed a threat.
The problem with this approach is that it is extremely difficult to verify compliance with a nonzero, quantitative limit.16 A verification regime designed to verify compliance with non-zero,
quantitative limits would require States to maintain detailed inventories of regulated chemicals,
and would require highly intrusive inspections to verify the accuracy of those detailed
inventories. Even then, verification would be problematic. In contrast, it is much simpler and less
burdensome to verify compliance with a zero limit. That is why the CWC establishes a zero limit
and does not include a de minimis exception for prohibited chemicals.17 Any de minimis
exception would make it exceedingly difficult to verify compliance with treaty prohibitions.
Article VII of the CWC obligates “each State Party . . . [to] prohibit natural and legal
persons anywhere on its territory . . . from undertaking any activity prohibited to a State Party
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under this Convention.”18 Article VII helps address both breakout and verification concerns. If
private parties could lawfully acquire large stockpiles of toxic chemicals, it would be very
difficult for international monitors to verify that those stockpiles were owned by private actors,
rather than the government. Moreover, even assuming that private ownership could be
established with certainty, governments in many countries could easily “break out” from treaty
constraints by seizing the stockpile for military use whenever they decided to do so.19 Thus, the
provision obligating States to prohibit private conduct inconsistent with the treaty is designed to
block one obvious mechanism that States could otherwise utilize to circumvent limitations on
state conduct. Congress faithfully implemented Article VII by enacting a federal statute that
makes it “unlawful for any person knowingly . . . to develop, produce, otherwise acquire . . .
stockpile, retain, own, possess, or use . . . any chemical weapon.”20
The combination of factors outlined above — a broad definition of chemical weapons, a
prohibition on development, acquisition, production, and stockpiling of toxic chemicals, a nonzero limit without any de minimis exception, and application of the treaty to private conduct —
led Chief Justice Roberts to proclaim, with obvious exasperation, that the government’s
interpretation of the statute would make “it a federal offense to poison goldfish.”21 The majority
could not believe that Congress so intended. But that is because the majority did not understand
that States designed the CWC to remedy the various deficiencies of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. In
making this claim, I am not suggesting that States specifically intended to punish people who use
toxic chemicals to poison goldfish. However, I am suggesting that the government
representatives who negotiated the CWC were very concerned about the breakout and
verification problems that undermined the effectiveness of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. To address
those concerns, they purposefully designed a treaty regime that obligated states to prohibit
private production or acquisition of toxic chemicals and precursors, even in very small
quantities, unless done for legitimate, socially beneficial purposes.
The preceding italicized phrase requires further explanation. Under the treaty, the term
“chemical weapons” means “toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for
purposes not prohibited under this Convention.”22 Moreover, the phrase “purposes not prohibited
under this Convention” is defined to mean “industrial, agricultural, research, medical,
pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes.”23 The CWC Act includes provisions that are
substantially identical to these treaty provisions.24 Thus, the treaty and statute permit the use of
toxic chemicals for peaceful purposes. Bond urged the Court to construe the statutory phrase
“peaceful purpose” to exclude from the statute’s reach all “non-warlike activities.” She argued
18
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that her conduct was not prohibited by the statute because it was not “warlike.”25 In contrast, an
amicus brief submitted by CWC experts who participated in treaty negotiations argued that the
phrase “peaceful purposes” encompasses only “beneficial or necessary” uses of toxic
chemicals.26 The CWC experts’ argument is supported by the principle of ejusdem generis.
According to that canon of statutory interpretation, “[w]here general words follow specific words
in a statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only objects similar in
nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words.”27 The use of toxic
chemicals to poison someone is not “similar in nature” to “industrial, agricultural, research,
medical, [or] pharmaceutical” uses. All of the explicitly permitted uses of toxic chemicals
involve socially beneficial activities. Ms. Bond’s attempt to poison her husband’s lover was not a
socially beneficial activity. Therefore, the statutory phrase “peaceful purpose” is best construed
to exclude Ms. Bond’s conduct. That construction is consistent with the overall architecture of
the CWC, which is designed to prohibit all production, acquisition and use of toxic chemicals,
except for socially beneficial purposes.
A brief summary of the underlying facts in Bond reinforces the conclusion that the CWC
Act prohibited her conduct. Carol Anne Bond is a microbiologist. She “stole the arsenic-based
specialty chemical 10-chlorophenoxarsine from her employer, the multinational chemical
manufacturer Rohm & Haas. She also ordered a vial of potassium dichromate over the Internet.
Both of these chemicals have the rare ability to cause toxic harm to individuals through minimal
topical contact.”28 She acquired these chemicals with the avowed purpose of making Myrlinda
Haynes’ life “a living hell.”29 Thus, even before she used the chemicals to poison Ms. Haynes,
Ms. Bond had violated the CWC Act because she knowingly “acquire[d] . . . retain[ed], own[ed]
[and] possess[ed]” chemical weapons, as that term is defined under the statute.30 If a State Party
to the CWC did what Ms. Bond did — i.e., acquired, retained, and possessed a small quantity of
toxic chemicals in non-weapons form with the intent of using those chemicals to poison a human
being — it is beyond dispute that the State would be violating its treaty obligations under the
CWC. Indeed, during negotiations, treaty negotiators referred explicitly to the attack on “Georgi
Markov, a defector from communist Bulgaria [who] was killed in London in 1978 by someone
wielding a ricin-loaded umbrella” to illustrate the type of peacetime conduct prohibited by the
treaty.31
Since the State is prohibited from acquiring toxic chemicals for the purpose of poisoning
someone, the State has a treaty obligation under Article VII(1) to prohibit private individuals
25
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from acquiring toxic chemicals for the purpose of poisoning someone.32 To be clear, I am not
saying that the treaty obligates the United States to prosecute Ms. Bond under federal law.
However, the treaty unambiguously obligates the United States to prohibit Bond from acquiring
toxic chemicals for the purpose of poisoning a human being. Consistent with that treaty
obligation, the statute unambiguously prohibited Bond from acquiring toxic chemicals for the
purpose of poisoning a human being.
The Bond majority concluded as a matter of statutory interpretation that the CWC Act did
not reach defendant’s conduct.33 That interpretation of the statute is untenable because it is based
on the Court’s failure to appreciate the crucial differences between the 1925 Geneva Protocol
and the 1993 CWC. The Court effectively rewrote the statute, rather than interpreting the statute.
The Court justified its exercise in judicial legislation by invoking the need to avoid a difficult
question of constitutional federalism. I turn now to that constitutional question.
II
The Constitutional Question in Bond
To address the constitutional question in Bond, it is helpful to distinguish among the three
concurring opinions authored by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito. In Justice Alito’s view, the
CWC itself “exceeds the scope of the treaty power.”34 Thus, the statute implementing the treaty
is unconstitutional because the underlying treaty is unconstitutional, insofar as it obligates “the
United States to enact domestic legislation criminalizing conduct of the sort at issue in this
case.”35 Justices Scalia and Thomas did not join Justice Alito’s opinion. Justice Thomas’s
opinion contends that the federal government can utilize the treaty power to regulate “intercourse
with other nations,” but not to regulate “purely domestic affairs.”36 Justices Scalia and Alito
agreed with Justice Thomas on this point. However, Justices Thomas and Scalia chose not to
reach the question whether the CWC exceeds the scope of the treaty power because “[t]he parties
in this case have not addressed the proper scope of the Treaty Power or the validity of the treaty
here.”37
Justice Scalia’s opinion (joined by Justice Thomas), contends that — even assuming that
the CWC itself is constitutional — the federal statute implementing the CWC is
unconstitutional.38 Thus, according to Justices Scalia and Thomas, the federal government’s
power to implement treaties is narrower than its power to make treaties. I refer to this position as
the “narrow view” of the federal government’s treaty-implementing power. The narrow view of
the treaty-implementing power is problematic for two primary reasons. First, the narrow view is
antithetical to the original understanding of the Constitution. Second, the narrow view, if
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adopted, would seriously impair the federal government’s ability to conduct foreign policy on
behalf of the nation.
Before defending these claims, one point of clarification is necessary. In my view, Justice
Thomas’s claim that the federal government cannot use the Treaty Power to regulate purely
domestic affairs is entirely correct.39 I am skeptical whether it would ever be appropriate for the
Supreme Court to invalidate a treaty on the grounds that the President and Senate had concluded
a treaty regulating purely domestic affairs. Nevertheless, the constitutional limit is a real limit,
regardless of whether it is judicially enforceable. In any case, it is not my purpose here to address
the scope of the federal government’s power to make treaties. Rather, my central claim is that the
Constitution is best construed to mean that the federal government’s power to implement treaties
is coterminous with its power to make treaties, however the treaty-making power is defined or
limited.
A. The Original Understanding of the Treaty-Implementing Power:
The United States declared its independence in 1776, creating a loose confederation
among thirteen sovereign states. The new nation concluded three treaties with France in 1778,
including a Treaty of Alliance and a Treaty of Amity and Commerce.40 The United States did not
adopt a formal document to codify the powers of the national government until 1781. The
Articles of Confederation, in force from 1781 to 1789, stipulated: “Each state retains its
sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not
by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States.”41 Thus, under the Articles,
power was concentrated mostly in state governments. The national government consisted
primarily of a single body, the Congress of the United States. Congress had “the sole and
exclusive right and power of . . . entering into treaties and alliances.”42 Congress exercised this
power to conclude treaties with the Netherlands, Sweden, France, Prussia, Morocco, and the
United Kingdom between 1782 and 1786.43
Although Congress had the power to make treaties, it lacked substantial legislative
power. Hence, Congress depended on the States to implement treaties. The problems inherent in
such a decentralized governmental structure became apparent soon after the United States
concluded a peace treaty with the United Kingdom. Under Article 7 of the 1783 peace treaty,
“his Brittanic Majesty” promised to “withdraw all his armies, garrisons, and fleets from the said
United States, and from every post, place, and harbor within the same.”44 When Britain failed to
implement this promise, John Adams, the Minister plenipotentiary from the United States to
Britain, delivered a diplomatic message to the British Secretary of State, Lord Carmarthen,
39
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protesting Britain’s failure to remove its troops.45 Carmarthen responded by summarizing British
complaints about U.S. violations of the peace treaty. Carmarthen’s message described in detail
“the grievances complained of by Merchants and other British Subjects having estates, property
and debts due to them in the several States of America.”46 John Jay, the U.S. Secretary for
Foreign Affairs, concluded that the British had many legitimate grievances about U.S. treaty
violations, which were generally attributable to the actions of State governments.47 Jay and other
national leaders wanted the States to comply with the peace treaty. Under the Articles of
Confederation, though, Congress was unable to compel state compliance.
Lord Carmarthen concluded his note to John Adams as follows: “I can assure you, Sir,
that whenever America shall manifest a real determination to fulfil her part of the treaty, Great
Britain will not hesitate to prove her sincerity to cooperate.”48 In short, treaty violations
attributable to State governments provided a justification for Britain to postpone removal of its
troops from U.S. territory, and Britain’s willingness to remove its troops depended on a
demonstration of U.S. resolve to halt those treaty violations. Thus, Congress’ inability to compel
state compliance with treaties posed a serious national security problem. “The continued
occupation of the garrisons by the British Army jeopardized the security of the northern frontier
and blocked vital trade routes.”49
Meanwhile, the United States’ economy suffered from a serious depression through much
of the 1780s.50 Thomas Paine quipped that the American states were “in want of two of the most
essential matters which governments could be destitute of — money and credit.”51 Several
factors contributed to the economic depression, but Britain’s imposition of retaliatory trade
measures was one significant factor. “America was now subject to Britain’s restrictive trade
measures, excluded from the lucrative British West Indian trade . . . and liable to all the
discriminatory duties levied against foreign bottoms in its direct trade with other countries.”52 To
make matters worse, “restrictive trade measures were also being imposed by America’s ally,
France, and in turn by Louis XVI’s ally, Spain.”53 The United States was eager to negotiate
commercial treaties with Britain and other European countries to promote economic
development at home. However, European nations refused to enter into commercial treaties with
the United States because they knew that the national government could not guarantee treaty
compliance by the States. “Continued treaty violations on the part of the American [States]
served to dampen such sentiment as existed in England for a reciprocal trade treaty.”54 Thus,
Congress’ inability to implement treaty obligations over the objections of recalcitrant State
45
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governments impaired the national government’s ability to make new treaties that were
necessary for the country’s economic development.
Aside from national security and economic concerns, treaty compliance was a matter of
national honor. John Jay wrote:
Contracts between Nations, like contracts between Individuals, should be faithfully
executed . . . honest nations like honest Men require no constraint to do Justice; and
tho impunity and the necessity of Affairs may sometimes afford temptations to pare
down contracts to the Measure of convenience, yet it is never done but at the
expence of that esteem, and confidence, and credit which are of infinitely more
worth than all the momentary advantages which such expedients can extort.55
Similarly, Alexander Hamilton was ashamed by the country’s inability to fulfil its international
obligations. He said:
We may indeed with propriety be said to have reached almost the last stage of
national humiliation. There is scarcely any thing that can wound the pride or
degrade the character of an independent nation which we do not experience. Are
there engagements to the performance of which we are held by every tie respectable
among men? These are the subjects of constant and unblushing violation.56
In sum, the national government’s inability to implement the nation’s treaty obligations over the
objections of recalcitrant States created both economic and national security problems. It also
thwarted the government’s attempt to conclude new treaties that would have advanced important
national interests. And it was a source of national shame and dishonor.
Representatives from twelve of the thirteen States met in Philadelphia between May and
September, 1787 to draft a new Constitution for the United States. As Professor Ramsey notes,
“there is general agreement [among historians] that foreign affairs difficulties were a root – if not
the root – of the drive to replace the Articles” of Confederation with a new Constitution.57 In
April 1787, as he was preparing for the Constitutional Convention, James Madison drafted a
famous essay entitled “Vices of the Political System of the United States.” One of the key vices
he identified was repeated “violations of the law of nations and of treaties.”58 Similarly, near the
very beginning of the Convention, Edmund Randolph noted that Congress’s inability to
implement treaties over the objections of State governments was one of the chief defects of the
Articles of Confederation.59 Thus, the men who met in Philadelphia in 1787 were determined to
create a new constitutional structure that would empower the federal government to implement
the nation’s treaty obligations and preclude recalcitrant States from obstructing treaty
implementation.
Justice Scalia would have us believe that the Framers failed to accomplish one of their
central goals because they drafted a Constitution that leaves the States with a residual power to
55
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block treaty implementation, even though the Framers intended to vest the federal government
with plenary power over treaty implementation. His view is based on a strained reading of the
nexus between the Treaty Power and the Necessary and Proper Clause. Article II of the
Constitution grants the federal government the power to make treaties. Article I, Section 10
precludes the States from making treaties. The Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the
power “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the .
. . other Powers vested by this Constitution” in the federal government.60 Justice Scalia contends
that the Necessary and Proper Clause empowers Congress to enact laws that facilitate the
exercise of the Article II power to make treaties, but the Clause does not empower Congress to
enact treaty-implementing legislation, except for legislation that it has the authority to enact on
the basis of other Article I powers.61
His narrow view of the treaty-implementing power ignores the critical connection
between the power to make treaties and the power to implement treaties, which was foremost in
the minds of the men who wrote the Constitution. By 1787, the Framers had learned from painful
experience that the national government’s inability to implement treaties over the objections of
recalcitrant States impaired the nation’s ability to make new treaties — treaties that were vitally
important for national economic development — because other countries would not conclude
new treaties with the United States unless the national government could guarantee faithful
observance of its treaty obligations. Justice Scalia’s view, if adopted as law, would make the
national government dependent on State governments, as a matter of constitutional law,62 to
fulfill treaty obligations that Congress could not implement on the basis of its other Article I
powers. In short, his view would re-introduce in the twenty-first century one of the central
problems that the United States confronted under the Articles of Confederation: a problem that
the Framers believed they had solved when they adopted a new Constitution. The Court should
not adopt this construction of the Constitution unless the text positively commands it.
Thankfully, the text is amenable to a different interpretation that is consistent with the Framers’
intentions. Under that view, the Necessary and Proper Clause empowers Congress to enact
treaty-implementing legislation because the national power to implement treaties is necessary to
assure other governments that the United States will honor its treaty commitments, and the
willingness of other governments to conclude treaties with the United States is necessary “for
carrying into Execution” the power to make treaties.
Justice Scalia may object that my interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause
threatens to expand the federal treaty power to the point where it obliterates state sovereignty. In
fact, the Constitution protects state sovereignty by giving States substantial control over treaty
60
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formation, while simultaneously denying States the power to obstruct treaty implementation.
Under Article II, the President cannot make a treaty unless “two-thirds of the Senators present”
consent.63 Under the original Constitution, Senators were chosen by state legislatures.64 The
combination of the super-majority requirement and the selection method for Senators gave state
legislatures substantial power to prevent the national government from making treaties contrary
to the interests of particular States. Although the Seventeenth Amendment introduced popular
election of Senators, the super-majority requirement in Article II still creates a substantial barrier
to treaty formation.65 Thus, consistent with the Framers’ intentions, treaties are hard to make and
hard to break. Under Justice Scalia’s narrow view of the treaty-implementing power, treaties
would be easy to break because every state government would retain the power to violate treaties
beyond the scope of Congress’ Article I powers, and the federal government would be powerless
to compel state compliance with those treaty obligations. That narrow treaty-implementing
power was a key flaw under the Articles of Confederation that the Constitution was designed to
remedy.
In sum, the rule of Missouri v. Holland — that Article I empowers Congress to enact
treaty-implementing legislation that it could not enact in the absence of a treaty — is entirely
consistent with the principle that the federal government is a government of limited, enumerated
powers. Congress’ power to implement treaties is a limited power because it is linked to the
Article II power to make treaties, which itself is a limited federal power.66 Moreover, Congress’
treaty-implementing power is an enumerated power because it fits comfortably within the
meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, as the Framers would have understood that Clause
in light of their experience under the Articles of Confederation.
B. Lessons from the Bricker Amendment Debate
Before Ms. Bond brought her case to the Supreme Court, the last major effort to overrule
Missouri v. Holland arose in the context of the Bricker Amendment controversy. The so-called
“Bricker Amendment” was actually a series of proposed constitutional amendments introduced
in the Senate in the early 1950s.67 The various proposals were designed to address perceived
threats that treaties, especially human rights treaties, posed to the U.S. constitutional system.68
The Senate Judiciary Committee held two sets of hearings on the proposed amendments: in May
to June 1952, when Truman was President; and in February to April 1953, when Eisenhower was
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President.69 The Judiciary Committee reported a proposed amendment to the full Senate in June
1953.70 Between 1951 and 1954, the Senate, the executive branch, the American Bar Association
(ABA), and others devoted substantial time and energy to the Bricker Amendment controversy.71
ABA leaders led the charge in favor of a constitutional amendment, along with Senator
John Bricker, a Republican from Ohio who was the leading advocate for the amendment in the
Senate. Proponents of the amendment sought to accomplish three primary goals: 1) to restrict
the President’s power to use executive agreements as a substitute for Article II treaties; 2) to
modify the Supremacy Clause so that most or all treaties would be non-self-executing; and 3) to
overrule Missouri v. Holland. The third goal is the most significant for the purpose of this essay,
but the other two goals also merit brief comments to clarify the contours of the Bricker
Amendment debate.
The Supreme Court decided in Belmont and Pink that sole executive agreements — i.e.,
international agreements concluded by the President without Senate consent — can supersede
conflicting state laws, just as treaties supersede conflicting state laws.72 Senator Bricker wanted
to reverse or limit Belmont and Pink. Hence, the amendment he proposed in February 1952
stated: “Executive agreements shall not be made in lieu of treaties.”73 The Eisenhower
Administration strenuously opposed limits on the domestic effects of sole executive
agreements,74 but the President almost lost on this issue. The so-called “George substitute,”
introduced by Senator Walter George in January 1954, stated: “An international agreement other
than a treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United States only by an act of the
Congress.”75 The George substitute would have overruled Belmont and Pink by making clear that
sole executive agreements are not effective as domestic law unless Congress enacts legislation to
give them domestic legal effect. The Senate voted 60-31 in favor of the George substitute, just
one vote short of the necessary two-thirds majority.76 Although the amendment did not pass, the
vote manifested substantial bipartisan support for a constitutional amendment that would have
constrained the President’s power to create domestic law by means of sole executive agreements.
Whereas President Eisenhower refused to compromise on the issue of sole executive
agreements, he was much more willing to compromise on the self-execution issue. In January
69
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1954, Attorney General Brownell and Senator Bricker agreed on the text of a proposed
constitutional amendment that would have made most treaties non-self-executing.77 That
amendment said:
The power to make treaties shall extend to the international relations of the United
States but shall not be employed to regulate matters which are not necessary and
proper for the conduct of our foreign affairs and which are normally and
appropriately within the local jurisdiction of the States. A treaty or other
international agreement shall become effective as internal law in the United States
only through acts of Congress provided however that treaty provisions relating to
the rights and obligations of aliens in the United States shall take effect as
provided in such treaties.78
The first sentence of the proposed amendment was intended to preclude the federal government
from using the Treaty Power to enter into human rights treaties. The second sentence would have
made most treaties non-self-executing, except for treaties “relating to the rights and obligations
of aliens in the United States.” The Eisenhower Administration was willing to accept this
amendment because it did not constrain the President’s power to make sole executive agreements
and because it would have left Missouri v. Holland untouched. Senator Bricker initially agreed to
the compromise, but reversed himself under pressure from Frank Holman, a past President of the
ABA who was a leading champion of the drive to amend the Constitution to overrule Holland.79
Attorney General Brownell reported that “Senator Bricker had agreed, then went back to Ohio,
checked with Mr. Holman, then turned around from the agreement.”80 Ultimately, the Senate
voted 50-42 against a version of the Bricker Amendment that would have made most treaties
non-self-executing.81
Of the various issues swirling around the Bricker Amendment controversy, debates about
the wisdom of overruling Holland were the most controversial. The ABA House of Delegates
approved a proposed constitutional amendment in February 1952, stipulating that “[a] treaty
shall become effective as internal law in the United States only through legislation by Congress
which it could enact under its delegated powers in the absence of such treaty.”82 The italicized
language was commonly referred to as the “which clause.” That clause was specifically intended
to overrule Holland, because key ABA leaders were convinced that the Holland rule posed a
significant threat to state sovereignty. In February 1953 Senator Arthur Watkins (R-UT),
working closely with the ABA, introduced a proposed constitutional amendment that included
the “which clause.”83 The version of the Bricker Amendment reported to the full Senate by the
Judiciary Committee also included the “which clause,” despite strenuous objections voiced by a
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minority on the committee.84 The Senate as a whole never voted on an amendment containing the
“which clause.” Ongoing consultations between the Senate and the Eisenhower Administration
in late 1953 and early 1954 ultimately persuaded Bricker’s supporters to abandon the “which
clause” because they recognized that the Senate would vote against any version of the
amendment containing such a clause.85
The “which clause” would have limited Congress’ power to implement treaties by
overruling Holland, leaving the federal government dependent upon the states to implement
treaties beyond the scope of Congress’ Article I powers. Both the Truman and Eisenhower
Administrations strongly opposed the “which clause.” They argued that the clause would
severely constrain the federal government’s power to implement treaties, thereby reviving the
problems that the United States experienced under the Articles of Confederation.86
Whereas President Eisenhower was willing to compromise on self-execution, he was
firmly opposed to the ABA’s attempt to overrule Holland. During a press conference in January
1954, a reporter asked President Eisenhower about the Bricker Amendment. The President
explicitly identified himself as a “States’ Righter.” He said he would “gladly agree” to some
proposed constitutional amendments related to treaties. However, he said:
I would like each of you to ask yourself this question: why was the Constitution
formed, and to replace the old Articles of Confederation? If you will look up the
history of the time, you will find that each one of the States under the Articles of
Confederation had a right to repudiate a treaty. Because of this fact, the Founding
Fathers . . . provided that a treaty properly ratified should take precedence over
any State law, including that State's constitution. That is so that . . . your President
and your Secretary of State . . . can represent one government, and can speak with
that much authority. They are not trying the impossible task of representing 48
governments. . . . But when you come down to this, that we have to go right back
to the general system that prevailed before our Constitution was adopted, then I
shall certainly never agree.87
Thus, in the President’s view, the proposal to overrule Holland was unacceptable — despite his
firm commitment to States’ rights — because it would effectively revive the system that
prevailed under the Articles of Confederation, leaving the President and Secretary of State with
the “impossible task of representing 48 governments.”
John Foster Dulles, who served as Secretary of State under Eisenhower, was no great
friend of the Treaty Power. Speaking to a regional meeting of the ABA in 1952, before he
became Secretary of State, Dulles warned that “[t]he treaty making power is an extraordinary
power liable to abuse.” He explained that treaties “can take powers away from the Congress and
84
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give them to the President; they can take powers from the State and give them to the Federal
Government or to some international body and they can cut across the rights given the people by
the constitutional Bill of Rights.”88 One year later, though, as Secretary of State, he spoke
forcefully against the ABA proposal to overrule Holland. He asserted that the ABA’s proposed
amendment:
would create a no-man’s land in foreign affairs. It would require the concurrence
of all 48 States to make effective such common treaties as treaties of friendship,
commerce, and navigation, extradition, reciprocal inheritance taxation, migratory
birds, collection of foreign debts, and status of foreign troops. In this field of
foreign affairs our country would not speak with 1 voice but with 49. The primary
objective of the framers of our Constitution in this respect would be defeated.89
Like President Eisenhower, Secretary of State Dulles was a firm believer in States’ rights who
feared abuse of the Treaty Power. Even so, he believed that the ABA’s proposed cure —
overruling Holland — was worse than the disease, because it would severely impair the federal
government’s ability to conduct foreign affairs on behalf of the nation.
Perhaps most surprisingly, Senator Bricker also opposed the ABA’s proposal to overrule
Holland.90 Unlike the ABA leaders, Bricker believed that the Holland rule was necessary to
preserve the national government’s power to implement treaties over the objections of
recalcitrant states. Bricker introduced three different versions of the Bricker Amendment in the
Senate in September 1951, February 1952, and January 1953.91 None of his proposed
amendments contained the “which clause.” In February 1953, Bricker wrote letters to his fellow
Senators to explain his opposition to the ABA’s proposed amendment:
He explained that the ABA’s amendment . . . would make it difficult if not
impossible to negotiate reciprocal agreements securing for Americans the right to
own property or engage in business in other countries in exchange for foreign
nationals being granted similar privileges in the United States. Since these matters
were regulated by the individual states, Congress would be unable to implement
such compacts if it were stripped of its authority to adopt any legislation
necessary and proper to carrying out such a treaty. State action would be required,
and Bricker questioned the wisdom of an amendment that gave the states what
amounts to a veto power over foreign policy. He was no defender of growing
federal authority, but even Bricker realized that the ABA’s amendment, especially
the “which” clause, went too far in trying to prevent federal encroachments.92

88

Dulles’ speech is quoted in part in the February 1, 1953 Report of the ABA Standing Committee on Peace and
Law. See 1953 Hearings, at 43-47 (reproducing key portions of that report).
89
1953 Hearings, supra note 69, at 829 (testimony of John Foster Dulles, April 6, 1953).
90
Bricker initially opposed the “which clause” because he did not wish to impose undue constraints on Congress’
legislative powers. Later, he endorsed the clause to preserve his political alliance with ABA leaders. See
TANANBAUM, supra note 67, at 80-82 (discussing Bricker’s initial opposition to the ABA proposal); id. at 91-92
(discussing Bricker’s capitulation to the ABA in the spring of 1953).
91
All three proposed amendments are reprinted in TANANBAUM, supra note 67, at 221-23.
92
TANANBAUM, supra note 67, at 82 (internal quotations omitted) (citing letters from Bricker to Senators Ives and
Smith).

15

Like President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles, Senator Bricker was determined to
prevent the use of the Treaty Power to encroach upon States’ rights. But like the President,
Bricker recognized that the Holland rule was essential to preserve national control over treaty
implementation so that individual States could not exercise “a veto power over foreign policy.”
In sum, Justice Scalia’s attempt to overrule Holland by judicial fiat has much in common
with the ABA’s earlier attempt to overrule Holland by constitutional amendment. The proposed
constitutional amendment failed because the ABA’s most important political allies —
Republicans who feared abuse of the Treaty Power and were strongly committed to States’ rights
— recognized that a decision to overrule Holland would revive the problems that the United
States experienced under the Articles of Confederation by constraining the federal government’s
power to implement treaties over the objections of recalcitrant States.
Two key developments since the 1950s reinforce the practical importance of the Holland
rule under our current constitutional system. First, over the past two decades the Supreme Court
has given teeth to the doctrine of limited and enumerated powers by enforcing constitutional
limits on the scope of Congress’ enumerated legislative powers.93 In contrast, the Bricker debates
occurred in an era when the Supreme Court adopted a much broader view of the scope of
Congress’ enumerated powers. When the Court adopted a very broad view of Congress’
Commerce Power, as it did between 1937 and 1995,94 the Holland rule had very little practical
significance because Congress could have implemented almost any treaty without relying on the
combination of the Treaty Power and the Necessary and Proper Clause. In contrast, under the
narrower view of the Commerce Power that the Court has applied since 1995, a decision to
overrule Holland would impose tighter practical constraints on Congress’ treaty-implementing
power because the Holland rule might provide the only viable basis for federal treatyimplementing legislation in some cases.95
Second, the practical significance of the Holland rule is related to the scope of non-selfexecution doctrine. Before 1945, the vast majority of treaties ratified by the United States were
understood to be self-executing.96 During the century-and-a-half between the Founding and
World War II, state and federal courts issued only about fifteen or twenty published decisions
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holding that a treaty was non-self-executing.97 In the modern era, by contrast, state and federal
courts routinely hold that treaties are non-self-executing. The reasons for the courts’ shifting
approach to self-execution doctrine are complex, but the publication of the Restatement (Second)
of Foreign Relations Law in 1965 and the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Medellin v. Texas98
were important factors that contributed to the expansion of the class of non-self-executing
treaties and the corresponding shrinkage of the class of self-executing treaties.99 As a practical
matter, the Holland rule does not affect the implementation of self-executing treaties because
federal legislation is not necessary to implement those treaties. Thus, if the Court decided
tomorrow to overrule Holland, the expansion of the class of non-self-executing treaties over the
past several decades would magnify the practical impact of that decision by increasing the
number of cases where the federal government would be forced to rely on the States to
implement the nation’s treaty obligations.
C. A Contemporary Example
On November 23, 2007, the United States signed the Convention on the International
Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance (the Child Support
Convention).100 The complex effort to encourage States to implement the Convention shows that
the federal government knows how to implement treaties in a manner that respects state
autonomy. The Child Support Convention “will, for the first time on a worldwide scale, create
uniform, simple, and inexpensive procedures for the establishment, recognition, and enforcement
of child support and family maintenance obligations in international cases.”101 President Bush
transmitted the treaty to the Senate in September 2008.102 The Senate Foreign Relations
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Committee held a public hearing on the Convention in October 2009.103 The Senate consented to
ratification in September 2010.104 As of this writing, the United States has still not ratified the
treaty. The delay in treaty ratification is related to the complex process envisioned for treaty
implementation.
While the treaty was being negotiated in The Hague, the Uniform Law Commission
(ULC) was preparing for domestic implementation of the treaty. The ULC, also known as the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, recommends model legislation
to state legislatures. The ULC had previously promulgated the Uniform Interstate Family
Support Act (UIFSA). As of 1998, all fifty states had adopted UIFSA, in part because the 1996
Welfare Reform Act, a federal statute, “made the enactment of UIFSA . . . a condition of state
eligibility for the federal subsidy for child support enforcement.”105 In July 2008, the ULC
approved amendments to UIFSA that were designed to facilitate state implementation of the
Child Support Convention. Accordingly, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommended
that treaty implementation “would be achieved through adoption of an amended version of
UIFSA by states and other relevant jurisdictions, as well as through conforming amendments to
Title IV of the Social Security Act.”106 As of December 2014, only twelve states had adopted the
2008 UIFSA amendments.107 Nevertheless, full implementation is likely within the next year or
two because Congress enacted legislation in September 2014 that conditions the continued
availability of certain federal benefits on the enactment of conforming state legislation by
January 1, 2016.108 The United States plans to ratify the Child Support Convention after all fifty
states have incorporated the UIFSA amendments into state legislation.
It is instructive to compare the implementation mechanism for the Child Support
Convention with the implementation mechanism chosen for the CWC. The primary goal of the
Child Support Convention “is to ensure the effective international recovery of child support and
other forms of family maintenance” through recognition and enforcement of maintenance
decisions.109 State courts already enforce child support decisions from courts in other states, so
there are existing mechanisms at the state level that can be utilized to implement the Convention.
Moreover, UIFSA was a pre-existing model law that “proved to be a near-perfect vehicle for
integrating a federally negotiated treaty into American state law.”110 In contrast, federal courts
are rarely called upon to enforce child support orders issued by state courts, so federal
enforcement of the Child Support Convention would have required either: 1) adding a new
category of cases to the dockets of federal courts; or 2) creating a new federal administrative
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bureaucracy to implement the Convention. In light of these factors, it was clearly more
convenient and efficient to rely on state governments to implement the Convention.
In contrast, reliance on state governments to implement the CWC would have been
neither convenient nor efficient. The CWC obligates the United States to “[p]rohibit natural and
legal persons anywhere on its territory” from developing, producing, acquiring, stockpiling or
retaining “toxic chemicals and their precursors,” except for purposes not prohibited by the
Convention.111 The Uniform Law Commission has never promulgated a model law that regulates
the development, production and stockpiling of toxic chemicals.112 I have not surveyed the laws
of all fifty states, but it seems unlikely that any state has enacted comprehensive regulations
governing the development, production, acquisition, and stockpiling of toxic chemicals.
Therefore, a decision to rely on state governments to implement the CWC would have required
the federal government to invent a novel mechanism to encourage States to enact new laws quite
unlike pre-existing state laws. In contrast, Congress could have relied on its Commerce Power to
enact a federal statute governing the development, production, and stockpiling of toxic chemicals
with a nexus to interstate commerce. Since the vast majority of toxic chemicals have some nexus
to interstate commerce, the Holland rule expands the scope of federal regulation only slightly by
enabling Congress to regulate the small fraction of toxic chemicals that lack a sufficient nexus to
interstate commerce to justify regulation under the Commerce Clause. Therefore, in the case of
the CWC, it was much more convenient and efficient to adopt federal implementing legislation,
rather than relying on the States to implement U.S. treaty obligations. Indeed, a constitutional
rule that forced the federal government to rely on the States to implement the CWC would
probably preclude the United States from fulfilling its treaty obligation to “[p]rohibit natural and
legal persons anywhere on its territory” from developing, producing, acquiring, stockpiling or
retaining “toxic chemicals and their precursors.”113
Of course, the goals of convenience and efficiency cannot justify enactment of federal
legislation that exceeds the scope of Congress’ enumerated powers. Nevertheless, the Court is
entitled to consider factors like convenience and efficiency in the context of deciding how
broadly or narrowly to construe the scope of Congress’ enumerated powers. The analysis in Part
II.A shows that the Holland rule is consistent with the text, structure, and original understanding
of the Constitution. The comparison of the CWC with the Child Support Convention
demonstrates that the Holland rule has not induced the federal political branches reflexively to
favor federal implementation over state implementation, to the detriment of the States.114 To the
contrary, the Holland rule gives Congress and the President the flexibility to decide, on a caseby-case basis, between state and federal mechanisms for treaty implementation, with a view to
ensuring that the United States faithfully executes its treaty obligations. The Court should
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hesitate to announce a new constitutional rule that deprives Congress and the President of that
needed flexibility, especially because there is no evidence that Congress has abused the treatyimplementing power that the Court recognized in Holland.
Conclusion
One puzzling question that arises from Bond is this: why did the federal prosecutor in
Pennsylvania decide to charge Bond under the CWC Act? He could have saved himself and
others a lot of trouble by settling for a conviction for mail theft.115 Was the prosecutor trying to
set up a test case to give the Court an opportunity to overrule Holland? Was he simply pursuing
the maximum penalty that he thought the law would support? We may never know the answer to
those questions. Regardless, as a matter of prudent judicial policy, the Court should be reluctant
to apply the heavy hammer of the Constitution to rectify a problem arising from a federal
prosecutor’s overzealous charging decision. Fortunately, a majority of the Justices chose the
prudent course: they misinterpreted the CWC Act to avoid ruling on the constitutional question.
If Justice Scalia had prevailed, the outcome would have been far worse.
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